DRAFT: COMMENTS AND CRITICISMS ARE WELCOME; UNAUTHORIZED QUOTATION OR DISTRIBUTION ARE NOT
1 Solzhenitsyn at Harvard, ed. Ronald Berman (Washington, DC: Ethics and Public Policy Center), p. 5. He went on to say that 'such a decline in courage is particularly noticeable among the ruling and intellectual elites, causing an impression of a loss of courage by the entire society'. Witness, for instance, Giscard d'Estaing claiming that 'the World is unhappy. It is unhappy because it dos not know where it is going, and because it guessed should it know, it would be to discover that it is going towards a catastrophe'. Quoted in Walter Laqueur, A Continent Astra y: Europe 1970 Europe -1978 (New York: Oxford UP, 1979), pp. 13-14.
Luhmann eventually became the prime theoretical adversary of Jürgen Habermas, the most prominent heir to the German Frankfurt School of Critical Theory, who had taken his distance from the '68 rebels, but tried to hold on to, broadly speaking, Social Democratic hopes -including plans for further democratizing the state administration 7 Chris Thornhill, Political Theory in Modern Germany (Cambridge: Polity, 2000), p. 174. 8 Helmut Schelsky, Die Arbeit tun die anderen: Klassenkampf und Priesterherrschaft der Intellektuellen (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1975). Schelsky's analysis was much influenced by Weber and Sorel. and the economy. 9 Habermas became arguably the most important philosopher for the environmental and feminist social movements that emerged in the 1970s alongside the revolutionary groupuscules and esoteric political splinter groups that the aftermath of '68 had produced. His primary concern was the protection of the integrity of what he called 'the lifeworld', that is, the realm of family and other interpersonal relations, as well as civil society, which ought to be shielded from the instrumental logic of the market and of public administration. The market and the state would always, so Habermas, have a tendency to 'colonize' the lifeworld; but social movements, pressure groups and, not least, intellectuals in the public sphere could resist such a colonization -and perhaps even achieve gradual de-colonization.
France's Antitotalitarian Moment
A suspicion of bureaucracy and a demand for personal (as well as group) autonomy animated a whole range of intellectuals who had emerged from the upheavals of the late 1960s, but who did not want to subscribe either to orthodox Marxism (they viewed the Communism's myths had been more of a moral and intellectual nature, rather than personal; and so it was only logical that left-wing intellectuals themselves had to dismantle them. However, the really important result by the mid-to late 1980s had been the almost complete dismantling of the communist counter-culture -in a way that had no parallel in Italy, which had been equally divided politically-culturally, but between Christian
Democrats and Communists, and where contestation -especially among workers themselves -and terrorism (of left and right) continued much longer than in France or
Germany. 18 What remained of socialism in France seemed rather uninspired: the more exciting ideals of the deuxième gauche were never put into practice, not least because
Mitterrand was obsessed with destroying the political chances of Michel Rocard to succeed him as president.
The Neoconservative Moment --in the US and Elsewhere
Meanwhile, on the other side of the Atlantic, the 1970s saw the rise of an intellectual phenomenon whose precise character -let alone policy implications -still cause much dispute today: neoconservatism. Neoconservatism emerged from the world of the 'New
York intellectuals' -children of poor Jewish immigrants who had gone to City College, joined the anti-Stalinist Left, only then to turn into fierce liberal Cold Warriors, with some joining the Congress for Cultural Freedom. In other words, the milieu from which neoconservatism proper was to emerge had already been through one major experience of still described himself as a democratic socialist -found hard to accept. The term neoconservatism itself was first applied by the Left as a term of opprobrium -but eagerly appropriated by Kristol and others.
Eventually, neoconservatism also developed a distinctive view on foreign policy.
In 1979 point out: where the libertarians subscribed to a kind of primacy of the economic and older American conservatives hankered after a primacy of culture (an aristocratic, Southern culture in particular), the necons thoroughly believed in the 'primacy of the political'. 21 In other words, statesmen really could make a difference. 22 As Kristol put it, 'neoconservatism is the first variant of American conservatism in the past century that is in the "American grain". It is hopeful, not lugubrious; forward-looking, not nostalgic;
and its general tone is cheerful, not grim or dyspeptic'. This meant endorsing modern life, broadly speaking, including technology and at least certain aspects of modern culture (but decidedly not any aspect of the counter culture).
To be sure, it wasn't all optimism. Allan Bloom -who was not a neoconservative in the very narrow sense but managed to write a surprise bestseller which resonated with conservatives of all stripes -saw the US becoming the victim of dangerous relativism in freedom in the world has devolved upon our regime, so the fate of philosophy in the world has devolved upon our universities, and the two are related as they have never been before. The gravity of our given task is great, and it is very much in doubt how the future will judge our stewardship.
24
Was neoconservatism an exclusively American phenomenon, as has often been claimed?
In one sense, it was not: other countries witnessed the phenomenon of the disillusioned The lasting legacies of the New Left were feminism and environmentalism -the former in particular could at least partially be integrated into parties which had understood themselves more or less without saying as 'productivist' and male-centred.
Environmentalism, however, was often institutionalized separately (in green partieswhich in fact initially understood themselves as 'anti-party parties', in Petra Kelly's words), but was over time also at least partly adopted by all parties. 26 As Rudolf Bahro put it, environmentalism was like a new 'magnetic field' -it thus changed the direction and position of existing parties (although Bahro drew exactly the opposite conclusion from his metaphor: he argued that 'it is difficult to absorb this into the existing party political system, and so the ecology movement has in fact turned into an alternative type of party' as part of what in the eyes of many observers appeared as a kind of collective mood swing away from progressive hopes.
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What was little understood outside a narrow French context, however, was that post-structuralism was -obviously, in a sense -a reaction against structuralism, which could easily be understood as a form of determinism.
Ultimately, Habermas and the French theorists shared a great deal more than was apparent at the time: both clung to an ideal of individual human autonomyexcept the terms with which that ideal was contrasted could not have been more 35 Habermas -arguably with the generosity of the philosophical victor -could much later admit that 'there can be no doubt concerning the healthy influence that postmodernism has had for contemporary debates.
The Descent from Mont Pèlerin
The real threat to Social Democracy was neither neoconservatism -which was not in principle hostile to the welfare state --nor postmodernism; it was altogether more unexpected, and it was in many ways based on a renewal of 'utopian energies' -except that the utopia in question was that of the unrestricted market and the strong state But he also turned out to be an advocate of the strong state, especially a state that was able to resist the demands emanating from society -in other words, special interest groups. He even argued for a new constitutional settlement ensuring that only universal laws (that is, not serving special interests) would be enacted and individual liberty maximized. In particular, he had in mind the creation of an upper house with a small membership -'an assembly of men and women elected at a relatively mature age for fairly long periods, such as fifteen years, so that they would not be concerned about being re-elected'. 37 In short: Hayek's thought proved popular, because it so clearly appeared to offer a solution to the 'governability crisis' of the 1970s. But, importantly, it also proved influential among dissidents east of the Iron Curtain: 'liberalism' came to be identified with Hayek much more than with John Rawls, for instance; in fact, Hayek turned into an almost iconic figure for intellectuals like Václav Klaus.
In the end, libertarianism turned out to be vastly more influential in the US than in Joseph claimed that 'the objective for our lifetime, as I have come to see it, is embourgeoisement'; he then went on to explain that 'our idea of the good life, the end product, and of embourgeoisement -in the sense of life-style, behaviour pattern and value-structure -has much in common with that traditionally held by Social Democrats, however we may differ about the kind of social economic structure best capable of bringing about and sustaining the state of affairs we desire'. 38 Even more so in continental Europe was there a sense that the achievements of the Social Democratic consensus had to be preserved -and Ralf Dahrendorf was far from being the only intellectual who felt that 'the consensus is in a certain sense the most in terms of progress that history has ever seen'. 39 
The Politics of Antipolitics under Post-Totalitarianism
The question whether intellectuals still mattered politically continued to be widely debated in the West during the last decades of the twentieth century. It could hardly be doubted, though, that they mattered in Central and Eastern Europe. Their dissident strategy from the mid-1970s onwards was based on what appeared to be an idea both of breathtaking simplicity and sheer genius: they wanted to take their regimes at their word, especially after socialist governments had signed the Helsinki Accords of 1975. 41 For instance, Charter 77, a motley group of reform Communists, Trotskyists, Catholic conservatives and assorted philosophical anti-modernists, sought to subscribe to a strict legal positivism and merely 'help' the Czechoslovak state to implement the Accords. As
Václav Benda, a leading Czech dissident, put it, 'this tactic of taking the authorities at their word is, in itself, a shrewd ploy'. 42 Rights talk reminded everyone about very their absence; but this was less in order to engage the regimes, as to 'talk past them'.
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Of course, the establishment of political organizations outside the various communist and socialist parties and their offshoots was strictly forbidden. So, almost by definition, any groups or associations being formed had to present themselves as 'apolitical' or perhaps even 'anti-political'. This also made conceptual sense, as the regimes were uniformly described by the dissidents as 'totalitarian' -that is, trying to monopolize the political. The statement 'it is supremely ironic that just at the moment when the concept of "totalitarianism" was losing its plausibility in the West, it was 41 It's worth remembering that dissidents did not call themselves dissidents, for the most part. 42 Patočka viewed as a distinctive European idea going back to Plato, and which meant both a resistance to a kind of self-forgetting in everyday business and a refusal of violent attempts to transcend everydayness, such as in war. 45 He also formulated the ideal of a 'community of the shaken' in the face of totalitarianism; and insisted on the specifically moral -again, as opposed to political -character of dissidence, claiming that morality 'is not here to make society work, but so that man can be man'. As one of the first spokesmen for Charter 77, he was arrested by the Czech secret police and died after a number of severe interrogations. Infamously, the authorities would try to disrupt his funeral with a motocross-race right next to the cemetery and a helicopter hovering above.
But the dissidents' voices could no longer be drowned out or silenced. Václav
Havel, who described himself as 'a philosophically inclined literary man', carried forward Patočka's legacy, also drawing on Heidegger to formulate a comprehensive critique of modernity and human beings' dependence on technology in particular -a critique that was supposed to be applicable to the West as much as the East. 46 Like
Solzhenitsyn at Harvard, Havel opposed 'rationalist humanism', 'the proclaimed and practiced autonomy of man from any higher force above him', or simply:
'anthropocentricity'. 47 In the end, Havel saw state socialism as just a more extreme or uglier expression of modernity's essence; in the same vein, Solzhenitsyn claimed that 'this is the essence of the crisis: the split in the world is less terrifying than the similarity of the disease afflicting its main societies'.
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Here was also another sense of 'antipolitics' -in the form of opposition to power politics in East and West -and especially power politics with nuclear weapons. As
György Konrád put it:
Antipolitics strives to put politics in its place and make sure it stays there, never overstepping its proper office of defending and refining the rules of Eastern Europe. By the same token, however, Havel had shown that despite the apparent 'auto-totality' of the system, the regimes were in fact extremely fragile.
In one sense Havel was to take anti-politics to an extreme which would alienate more traditional liberal democrats: in his view, restoration of parliamentary democracy was to be merely a first step that had to be followed by an existential revolution and the 'restoration of the order of being'. Rather than copying existing models in the West, the goal was a 'post-democracy', characterized, above all, by the absence of political parties.
Yet it would be wrong to think that all 'anti-politics' was anti-institutional per se. Also, Fukuyama's 'End of History' was in fact by no means the naïve liberal triumphalism it has so often been made out to be in retrospect -and as it has been subject to endless ridicule. Fukuyama, after all, did not predict the end of all conflict and violence; rather, he asserted that there was, in the long run, no attractive alternative way of life or way of organizing human collectives that could rival liberal democracy. 
